On April 20, 2026, disturbing scenes emerged from South Africa. Nigerian-owned shops looted, individuals assaulted, and communities gripped by fear as xenophobic violence resurfaces. These attacks are not new; the country witnessed similar bloody attacks in 2015 and 2019, when dozens of Nigerians were affected. At a time when increasing numbers of Nigerians are leaving the country in search of economic stability, a phenomenon popularly termed “Japa”, the expectation might be that African destinations offer some degree of cultural familiarity and solidarity. Instead, many migrants encounter hostility, exclusion, and, in extreme cases, organised violence. This contradiction exposes a deeper policy failure across the continent. What obligations do African states owe to migrants from within the continent, and why has collective responsibility remained so weak?
The scale of Nigerian emigration reflects rational decision-making under pressure. Young people, professionals, and skilled workers are leaving in response to inflation, unemployment, and declining public services. While destinations such as the UK and Canada dominate public imagination, South Africa remains an important, if complicated, option due to its relatively advanced economy and regional proximity. Yet this choice carries well-known risks. Xenophobic violence in South Africa is recurrent, not incidental.
It is important to acknowledge nuances. A small minority of Nigerians abroad have been involved in criminal activities, and this has shaped negative perceptions in host communities. However, this reality cannot justify the indiscriminate targeting of Nigerians as a group. The pattern of attacks, often coordinated, systematic, and directed at livelihoods, suggests something more than spontaneous frustration. It reflects entrenched narratives that frame foreign Africans as economic threats, combined with weak law enforcement responses that allow impunity to persist. For many migrants, the pursuit of opportunity has become entangled with exposure to violence.
These tensions do not remain confined within South Africa’s borders; they reverberate diplomatically. Nigeria’s past responses, including the evacuation (2019 Air Peace) of citizens during previous waves of violence and the temporary recall of diplomatic representatives, demonstrate the seriousness of the issue and the limits of reactive measures. Public anger in Nigeria has also translated into protests, and many are criticising the Federal Government’s response as weak and ineffective compared to Ghana’s swift diplomatic intervention to protect its citizens. While large-scale retaliation has so far been contained, the risk of escalation remains real, particularly in the absence of structured grievance management channels between the two countries.
At the institutional level, the response has been notably inadequate. The African Union continues to promote continental integration and free movement, yet there is no binding framework that guarantees the protection of African migrants within member states. Regional bodies are similarly constrained. Calls have intensified for the African Union to intervene, highlighting the absence of an effective continental response mechanism. ECOWAS, despite its relatively advanced free movement protocols, has no jurisdiction in Southern Africa, while the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been largely muted in confronting xenophobic violence within its region. This fragmentation leaves a critical gap: there is no continental mechanism capable of responding rapidly and decisively when such crises emerge.
The contrast with other regions is instructive. While far from perfect, the European Union has developed frameworks that at least establish minimum standards for the treatment of migrants and minority populations, alongside mechanisms for accountability. Africa’s integration project, by comparison, remains heavily rhetorical when it comes to the protection dimension. This gap is becoming increasingly untenable as intra-African migration grows.
Ultimately, the persistence of xenophobic violence represents a series of isolated incidents and a stress test for African solidarity. The ambitions of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which depend not only on the movement of goods but also of people, sit uneasily alongside the reality of Africans being violently rejected by fellow Africans. Without credible protections, mobility becomes a gamble rather than an opportunity.
Addressing this challenge requires a shift from reactive diplomacy to proactive policy design. First, Nigeria and South Africa should formalise a bilateral migrant protection framework that establishes clear obligations, including rapid consular response timelines and joint crisis management protocols. Second, the African Union should develop a binding continental protocol on intra-African migrant safety, setting enforceable minimum standards for host countries. Third, ECOWAS and SADC should establish a joint rapid-response mechanism that can be activated when xenophobic violence reaches defined thresholds, enabling coordinated diplomatic intervention.
At the national level, Nigeria can take additional steps to protect its citizens abroad. A diaspora risk registry, managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would allow for real-time monitoring of high-risk environments and more effective communication with Nigerians in affected locations. Finally, there is a need to confront the narratives that sustain xenophobia. This requires coordinated diplomatic and public engagement strategies that challenge the criminalisation of Nigerian identity, while clearly distinguishing between individual wrongdoing and collective blame.
The costs of inaction are already visible, in lost lives, strained diplomatic relations, and weakened trust in regional institutions. If Africa is to move toward genuine integration, it must first address the contradictions that place its own citizens at risk.
Culled from Nextier
